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Title of Dissertation:   An Empirical Assessment of Trade Engagements: 
                       Linking China Africa and the Belt and Road 
                       Initiative 
 




The Belt and Road Initiative has included many policies in service of integrating 
China and Africa. These policies and the resulting effects have always varied for 
the various partners of the Initiative without much study completed with regards to 
related issues. This research investigates the direct economic impact of the Belt and 
Road policies with respect to seven participants: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa.  
 
A general introduction to Sino-Africa relationships and the bonds created are 
presented. The basic idea and ambition of the Belt and Road Initiative is discussed, 
especially the aspect of international cooperation between various continental 
groups. Focus is given to the historical bindings of the Initiative with respect to the 
legendary Silk Road.  
 
Economic indicators are adopted as methods of policy analysis and are introduced 
along with the data sources and its formats followed by the computational results 
presented in order of indicator type and country in tabular form. The indicators are 
the Revealed Comparative Advantage, Trade Integration Index, Trade 
Complementarity Index and Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Index.  
 
The analysis result is that Africa SITC export values shows trade in raw materials 
Trade integration index indicates greater need of Chinese imports than African 
exports. Complementarity index shows that trade cooperation is not ideal 
Herfindahl Hirschman product index reveals that African exports are sensitive to 
market changes. 
 
The penultimate sections provide observations, implications and recommendations 
for each of the economies analyzed and finally conclude with policy implications.  
The Summary and Conclusions chapter reinforces the current status of the Belt and 
Road participating economies studied, the recommendations for improvement and 
summarizes all the implications for future cooperation in the Initiative. 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Research Background  
 
According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),  
Africa has a large domestic market that holds both important challenges and 
opportunities. With a total population of about 1.2 billion and a combined national 
income that surpasses the trillion-dollar mark, it has a significant place and potential 
in the world economy. But African countries are facing challenges in realizing their 
full capacity. Economic development gaps both between African and the developed 
countries and among African countries are immense. While Africa accounts for 16.3 
per cent of the world population its share in the world economy amounts to 2.9 per 
cent. (UNCTAD, 2019). Africa’s total trade with to the rest of the world averaged 
US$4.193 trillion in current prices in the period 2015–2019. According to the data 
extracted from Trade map, as of 2019, the value of exports from Africa to China is 
totaled at US$751 billion. 
It is stated that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is the 
largest free trade area in terms of participating countries, is expected to lead to greater 
exports, higher value-addition in manufacturing and services, and to bring about a 
more diversified intra-African trade opportunity for the continent with benefits spilling 
over to small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa. However, there are existing 
problems such as basic infrastructure, including access to clean, reliable and affordable 
energy, human capacities skills and also the lack of access to new technologies, 
knowledge, information and finance will continue to widen the gap between Africa 
and rest the of world causing Africa to be left behind (Yong, 2019). 
Most of Africa’s exports to China are comprised of, lubricants, mineral fuels, and 
related materials, iron ore, metals, and food and agricultural products amongst other 
things while China exports a range of machinery, transportation, communications 
equipment, as well as manufactured goods to African countries. China’s outreach 
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continued when President Xi Jinping announced the project of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) or New Silk Road.  
The Initiative aims to promote connectivity, infrastructure development, trade and 
investments among other activities between China, Eurasia, and Africa. (Chen 2016). 
By focusing on Africa, the Belt and Road is considered a shift in hopes to strengthen 
bonds that already existed, hence this research is important because it means more 
exchange of good and services between countries and more investments mobility 
which can hint the Belt and Road Initiative could have a positive impact to the trade 
of good and services because exchange of good and services between countries will 
be easy. (Lahiani, 2019).  
The Belt and Road Initiative brings trade related opportunities between Africa and 
China. This is seen through planned and existing joint infrastructure projects such as 
dams, development of ports, roads etc. which allows commodities to be traded between 
both Africa and China. In addition, the mere existence of these infrastructure projects 
creates jobs and opportunities for trade. (Han et al, 2019., Nantulya, 2019). 
Furthermore, Chinese enterprises both private and public are increasingly acquiring 
stakes in resource projects ignored and/or relegated to lower priority status by other 
initiatives. (Dong et al, 2018). Natural resources play an integral role in the initiative, 
China has become Africa’s largest customer for raw materials in multiple sectors. 
(Zhou,2019). 
 
1.2 Relevance  
The Belt and Road Initiative is a major factor in China’s ambitions for larger 
international cooperation and its peaceful rise. BRI policies are presumably mutually 
beneficial for all participants, however, there is an acute lack of related literature. For 
example, Igbinoba assessed trade in the BRI but merely discussed the possibility of 
beneficial outcomes in various scenarios; Ehizuelen and Abdi’s goal was to examine 
China-Africa relations while centering on the implementation and likely inclusion of 
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more African countries in the One Belt One Road initiative (Igbinoba 2017, Ehizuelen 
& Abdi, 2017).  
Policies and ambitions are rarely static and instead are quite mutable. It is critical that 
studies of the policies and effectiveness are regularly conducted. The major relevance 
(and value added) of this study is to provide updated analysis about the effectiveness 
of the Belt and Road Initiative and contribute to the list of methods to optimize the 
existing trade and development policies.  
1.3 Objectives 
There is certain form of responsibility to provide observation and examination of 
policies where traceability is available. The conclusion of the analysis will help to 
provide a meaningful level of correlation and/or causation of the Belt and Road 
Initiative and the economic progress of different countries. This means that the 
viability of the Initiative in the selected countries can be discussed. Such discussion is 
acutely useful for both current and future literature. 
The most important objective of this research is to indicate the effectiveness of the 
Belt and Road Initiative in selected African countries and to reveal where trade and 
cooperation can be optimized. A secondary purpose is to identify and highlight the 
effective policies of trade within the Belt and Road Initiative and review the 
implications both positives and negatives of the initiative in its current state in Africa. 
By completing this analysis, the hope is to increase the body of accumulated 
knowledge on the BRI and related topics of Sino-African relations.   
1.4 Limitations  
Issues with this research include lack of updated information and biases within the 
data. There seems to be lack of interest in the study of trade between Africa and Asia. 
Many articles focus more on implications for the US and Europe and lack perspectives 
for other regions. Examples include Draper’s 2009 article which investigates African 
trade and integration challenges with focus on Europe’s role and Ghiasy’s discussion 
of the maritime component of the BRI and possible security issues but neglects trade 
impact for Africa (Draper 2009, Ghiasy 2018).  
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Internally, African government and economies are not very rigorous about providing 
data publicly while this may not be malicious, the possibility of gaps within the data 
cannot be ignored. Current instances of this phenomena include Tanzania’s sporadic 
publication of its Statistical Abstract and Gross Domestic Product articles and 
Ethiopia’s complete lack of self-reported since 2017.  Even when data is available, it 
is not uncommon for reporting agencies to provide the data in a more favourable light. 
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2 Introduction to Belt and Road Initiative 
 
2.1 China-Africa Relations 
 
As early as the 7th century, China and Africa had contact, made close friendship, made 
positive contributions to the advancement and progress of human society and began 
direct contacts by sea route. Since that engagement, cultural exchanges and trade 
between China and Africa had expanded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's 
Republic of China, 2014). Sino-African relations refer to the historical, political, 
economic, military, social and cultural connections between China and the African 
continent (Ooi 2004). According to Moumouni, Sino-African relations underwent 
roughly four stages. The first stage was in the early 1950s to early 1960s where New 
China faced pressure and adversary from the US, followed by a split with the USSR, 
which added to Beijing’s isolation. To gain friends, China embarked on a vast support 
of African Liberation Movements till most of these won independence. The second 
stage was in the early 60s to mid-1970s where full-scale ideology inspired relations. 
China maintained good links with revolutionary countries, providing them with 
military hardware, infrastructure construction, medical assistance and training，etc. 
The third stage was in the mid-70s to end-80s where the Chinese Reform and Open-
Door Policy and the defining of a new vision on foreign relations. Africa embarked on 
the “lost decade” which was characterized by recession and less density in its relations 
with China.  And the final stage is in the early 1990s onward where regime changed 
in Africa and implementing of a new policy on Sino-African relations, supposed now 
to serve economic development (Moumouni,2019).  
In the framework of three decades of a robust economy, China had emerged as the 
single member of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with more 
economic interaction with Africa and over this period, China had emerged as one of 
the most powerful industrial powers on the surface of the planet. Africa, a continent 
endowed with an array of scarce natural resources, such as oils and gases, minerals, 
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and virgin forests, was identified by China as particularly suited for its economic 
objectives (Bbaala, 2015). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit  
held in Beijing from 4 to 5 November 2006, which attracted 48 African countries and 
42 African heads of state (Chun 2009) demonstrated the popularity of China’s foreign 
policy, at least among the elites, in Africa. Today, China boasts of several trade-related 
deals with most African governments that have culminated in Chinese multinational 
corporations’ involvement in the extractive industry, construction, agriculture, 
manufacturing and commerce on the continent (Bbaala, 2015). Africa–China trade has 
been growing at approximately 20 percent per year. Foreign direct investment has 
grown even faster over the past decade, with a breakneck annual growth rate of 40 
percent. (Dong et al, 2018).  
 
2.2 The Belt and Road Initiative  
 
2.2.1 Overview  
Since the year 2001, China has been emerging in the world economy; and more 
recently with the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  The BRI, 
with its “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk 
Road,” is now the largest platform for international cooperation, reflecting the new 
approach of China’s development and diplomatic strategy (Zhang et al, 2018). On 7th 
September of 2013 Chinese president Xi Jinping gave a speech at the Nazarbayev 
University with the title ‘Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better 
Future’.   
"To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the 
Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an 
’economic belt’ along the Silk Road. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the 
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With that in mind, China put forward a plan to revive the Ancient Silk Routes in a 
contemporary form of cross continental economic collaboration network, in order to 
strengthen trade and investment partnerships across Asian, European and African 
markets. In May 2017, Beijing introduced their initiative and invited the global 
community to join powers and contribute to the ‘win-win’ project of the century during 
the Belt and Road Economic Forum (Phillips, 2017).   
The BRI aims to 
... promote the connectivity of [the] Asian, European and African continents and their 
adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the 
Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity 
networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development 
in these. (Dong et al, 2018). 
 
2.2.2 The Belt   
According to the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), The belt refers to an economic 
cooperation area including European countries, China and West Asia. The 
inventiveness calls for the incorporation of the region into a unified economic area 
through expanding trade having more cultural exchanges and constructing 
infrastructures. The South Belt links China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the 
Indian Ocean. The North Belt goes through Central Asia, and Russia to Europe. The 
Central belt goes through Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean. On the north side the belt, is the historical Silk Road, and areas such 
as South Asia and Southeast Asia, are included in the extension The Belt connects 
countries such as Germany, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine Italy, etc which rich in 
resources of minerals, energy, land tourism, etc and some are world industrial powers 
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2.2.3 The Road   
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), refers to the road. This is a plan of 
action, aimed at investing and nurturing collaboration in Oceania, North Africa 
Southeast Asia, and, through several bodies of water that are connected– the South 
Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, and the broader Indian Ocean area, connects The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Africa South Asia, West 
Asia, and Europe. However, today the road has become a great waterway for maritime 
exchanges between China and other countries such as Kenya, Egypt, Vietnam, 
Singapore etc. (DU, 2015). 
 
Figure 1: Silk Road Economic Belt & 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
Source: China Division 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), consists of two parts: a series of sea-routes 
supported by existing and new Chinese ports, providing better access to Africa, Middle 
East and Europe from China and a network of logistic and economic corridors over 
land. (Otmakhova, 2017) 
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The Silk Road Economic Belt includes 6 corridors for economic cooperation: (1) 
China-Pakistan Economic, (2) New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic, (3) China-
Mongolia-Russia Economic, (4), China-Indochina Peninsula Economic, (5) 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic, (6). China-Central Asia-West Asia 
Economic (Standard Chartered, 2019). Networks of rail routes, waterways, roads, 
pipelines and information highways that link industrial and energy clusters will make 
up these corridors and will also contain both maritime component and an overland. 
(Das 2017). 
 
2.2.4 Visions, Goals and Actions Plan 
 
In order to again better understanding of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is 
important to understand the BRI visions and action plan (Du, 2016). These visions and 
plans were published by the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic 
of China. (National Development and Reform Commission et al). The BRI consists of 
five major goals:  
Policy Coordination - Policy coordination is critical and fundamental in the 
implementation of the BRI initiative. It will comprise inter-governmental 
cooperation, macro-policy exchanges and communication mechanism to further 
mutual political trust among participating countries. 
Facilities Connectivity - The priority area for BRI is to improve the connectivity 
of the infrastructure in countries along the Belt and Road areas. It is expected to 
link up unconnected road sections, port infrastructure construction, and 
cooperation in order to deliver international transport facilitation. Also, the 
connectivity of energy infrastructure and the construction of cross border optical 
cables and communication trunk line networks would be a priority for the BRI.Skip 
a line or two lines?  
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Investment and Trade - This area is to ensure improvement in investment and trade 
facilitation, enhancing customs cooperation, expanding trade areas and developing 
modern service trade and cross-border e-commerce. The objective is to eliminate 
investment barriers, expand mutual investment areas and strengthen cooperation 
in emerging industries and to encourage Chinese enterprises/companies to 
participate in infrastructure construction by making industrial investments in 
countries along the Belt and Road Corridors. 
Financial Integrations - The success of the BRI initiative would be based on sound 
and effective financial integration of all countries along the Belt and Road. 
Systems would be put in place to a build a currency stability system and the 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS New 
Development Bank.  a line or two lines here? 
People to People Bonds - This is to ensure friendly cooperation among countries 
along the One Belt One Road corridors to promote cultural and academic 
exchanges between China and participating countries. It will be in the form of 
sending students to each other’s countries for exchange programmes. The 
cooperation in science and technology is expected to increase and think tanks in 
the Belt and Road countries will be supported to jointly undertake research with 
special forums (Mensah et al, 2016). 
The Chinese government founded the International Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NBD) and the Silk Road Fund in order to 
support to this large project. However, reports stated that up to this point, most the 
funding came from the state-owned China Development Bank (CBD) and four 
commercial banks (Wildau & Ma, 2017). As part of the BRI, China lends other 
countries the money to apprehend infrastructural projects such as oil pipelines, power 
plants, ports, highways and railways. Another vital motive behind the BRI is that China 
wished to export its proficiency in construction of infrastructure and produce business 
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2.3  The Belt and Road: Historical Inspiration 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative originates from the Silk Road, which is the name of the 
route that connected ancient China with Central Asia, Western Asia and the European 
continent. It was already open in the second century AC and was the fundamental trade 
route, starting in China and connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. (Christian, 2000) This 
route provided a thoroughfare for goods and ideas between China and the other 
cultures of Central Asia; India and Persia. The route began in Chang’an (present-day 
Xi'an, capital of the Shaanxi province) and crossed Gansu and Xinjiang provinces to 
Central Asia, West Asia until the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. The direct exchange 
of goods, such as textiles, metal ware, and ceramics, inspired the Tang Dynasty (618 - 
907), which it is known for being one of the most prosperous dynasties in the history 
of China. On the other hand, a web of maritime routes connected Chinese seaports like 
Guangzhou with the south of India, the Persian Gulf, and the Eastern coast of Africa. 









Historically, economic schemas (especially the theoretical ones) included or trended 
towards the notion that the relationship of trade and growth is advantageous for all 
parties involved. Frameworks such as the Hecksher-Ohlin model or the Ricardian 
model posit this general idea. Fascinatingly, there is surprisingly insufficient empirical 
data to support a conclusion in either direction. In fact, a sector where imports out-
perform domestic products and exports suffer from quantity volatility would indicate 
a negative relationship (Igbinoba, 2017). The current consensus is that greater global 
integration of economies will positively affect growth, however, the short-term 
domestic effects rely on the agile reaction to competition in those markets. 
 
In order to explore the current economic status of the countries involved in the Belt 
and Road Initiative, it is necessary to complete certain statistical analysis of trade data. 
Rather than assuming the advantage or disadvantage of any singular framework, it is 
useful to synthesize various points or indicators from each, utilizing each one to 
provide some assessment of the integration and the policies associated.  
 
Synthesis is generally an insightful technique in methodical research. Incremental 
improvements are often the sum of the same components re-analysed and re-assembled  
by adopting radical new thought or even standard techniques from other fields. The 
rule of thumb in any instance of analysis by synthesis is to avoid many conjectures and 
input only data reliably available and verifiable. This type of analysis provides better 
measures to draw conclusions from since each indicator describes another dimension 
of the economic relationship. 
 
The methodology selected for the research is as follows: the analysis will be in the 
form of both qualitative and quantitative data. While qualitative data will be collected 
from previous research papers, official reports, books etc. the quantitative data will be 
collected and analyzed using formulas or in other words trade indicators. These 
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indicators will be used to find the relation between the growth of a countries’ economy 
and trade and assess trade patterns, potentials and gains. The indicators according to 
the World Banks are as follows: 
 
3.1.1 Revealed Comparative Advantage Index 
Measures of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) have been used to help assess a 
country’s export potential. The RCA indicates whether a country is in the process of 
extending the products in which it has a trade potential, as opposed to situations in 
which the number of products that can be competitively exported is static. It can also 
provide useful information about potential trade prospects with new partners. 
Countries with similar RCA profiles are unlikely to have high bilateral trade intensities 
unless interindustry trade is involved. RCA measures, if estimated at high levels of 
product disaggregation, can focus attention on other non-traditional products that  
might be successfully exported. The RCA index of country 𝑖 for product 𝑘 is often 
measured by the product’s share in the country’s exports in relation to its share in 
world trade: too much space, skip a line or two lines here?  








Where X is the value of country i’s exports of product 𝑘 to country 𝑗 and w world 
exports of product 𝑘 to country 𝑗. Generally, a pre-selected range of values is adopted 
to assess the existence of comparative advantage between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗, in this 
study values greater than 1 indicates an advantage and multiples of 1 (for example 2, 
5, 9) indicates an extreme advantage. (Igbinoba, 2017). 
 
3.1.2 Trade Intensity Index 
The trade intensity index (T) is used to determine whether the value of trade between 
two countries is greater or smaller than would be expected based on their importance 
in world trade. It is defined as the share of one country’s exports going to a partner 
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Where Xie and we are the values of country i’s exports and of world exports to country 
j and where It and Wt. are country i’s total exports and total world exports respectively. 
An index of more (less) than one indicates a bilateral trade flow that is larger (smaller) 
than expected, given the partner country’s importance in world trade. 
 
3.1.3 Trade Complementarity Index 
(3) The trade complementarity index (TCI) can provide useful information on 
prospects for intra-regional trade in that it shows how well the structures of a 
country’s imports and exports match. It also has the attraction that its values 
for countries considering the formation of a regional trade agreement can be 
compared with others that have formed or tried to form similar arrangements. 
The TCI between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 is defined as:𝑪𝒊𝒋 




(4) In this case 𝑪𝒊𝒋 
𝒌 is the trade complementary between country 𝑖 and j for the 𝑘 
commodity. The comparative advantage of country 𝑖 in the exportation of 
the 𝑘 commodity is 𝑹𝑪𝑨𝒙𝒊
𝒌  and the comparative disadvantage of country 


























   
In country 𝑖 and the rest of the word  𝑿𝒊
𝒌  and 𝑿𝒘
𝒌   are commodity 𝑘’s export values; 
In country 𝑖 and the rest of the world, 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑤  are the aggregate export values; In 
country j, 𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the import value of the 𝑘 commodity and in the country 𝑗, 𝑀𝑖 is the 
aggregate import value. In the international market if a country has advantage in 
product 𝑘, and its trade partner has advantage in a product that’s different, it shows 
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complementarity exist and if both parties engage in bilateral trade cooperation, the 
potentials for benefits in trade are high. (Igbinoba, 2017). 
 
3.1.4 Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Index 
This indicator is defined as a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the product 
concentration of merchandise exports at the country level. It is calculated according to 
















With 𝑋 as country 𝑖’s total export value, 𝑥 as the export value of product 𝑘 from 
country 𝑖, and 𝑛 as the number of products exported by country 𝑖 (Igbinoba, 2017). 
Generally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is used in the analysis of competing 




The present study relies on databases which are used for the analysis, namely one 
database containing trade data by product and country to calculate the dependent 
variable, another for the amount of aid by sub‐category and recipient country. Data 
from the TRADE MAP which sources its information from United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics (UN-COMTRADE) will be extracted and used for the 
analysis. The databases mentioned above reports thorough data about imports and 
exports data based on various internationally recognized trade classifications. The 
most common classifications are the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) and the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HS). 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is a classification of goods used to 
classify the exports and imports of a country to enable comparing different countries 
and years. The classification system is maintained by the United Nations. Using the 
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SITC statistics, trade commodities will be divided into categories based on the 
international merchandise trade. The nine SITC categories are divided into three 
categories. The first category is the primary intensive resource commodities and 
includes SITC 0 (food and live animals), SITC 1 (beverages and tobacco), SITC 2 
(crude materials and ores), SITC 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) and 
SITC 4 (animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes). The second category is the capital-
intensive secondary commodities consisting of SITC 5 (chemicals and related 
products), SITC 6 (manufactured goods), SITC 7 (machinery and transport equipment) 
and SITC 8 (miscellaneous manufactured products).  The last category is the special 
transactions commodities and is composed of SITC 9 (commodities not classified 
elsewhere).  
The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) is a secondary (and 
often competing) classification of trade goods with similar goals to the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC). This system is maintained by the World 
Customs Organization since 1988 and has released updated versions of the system. It 
is divided into 21 sections, 99 chapters and thousands of headings and sub-headings. 
The products are classified in terms of the 2007 Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS) but then were converted to the SITC codes. 
Countries in the Belt and Road Initiative used in the analysis are China, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania using each country latest 
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4 Results and Analysis 
 
By applying the four indicators described in the methodology, the following results 
were obtained. All results were calculated by country, SITC and year of most recent 
reliable data. Note that SITC UNK is meta-category used to describe goods without a 
direct relationship from HS to SITC systems.  
 
Table 1: SITC 
 
Unit: $US 10,000 
 
Table 1 shows the export values in nine SITC categories with its relevant totals for 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania for the latest year. 
For Egypt, SITC 3 (Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) is ranked the 
highest in exports. In Ethiopia, the highest number of exports is from SITC 2 (Crude 
materials, inedible, except fuels). In Ghana, SITC 2 has the highest exports as well as 
Kenya. For Nigeria the top number of exports is in STIC 3. In South Africa, SITC 2 is 
ranked the highest and finally in Tanzania SITC 2 shows to have the highest number 
of exports. Table 1 also reveals that in the listed countries, SITC 2 (Crude materials, 










CHINA 2018 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2018 
SITC 0 70063 9445 58954 9208 1500 350462 9377 
SITC 1 0 0 0 86 198 32225 14441 
SITC 2 41139 223162 291128 78136 76024 751776
0 
95611 





SITC 4 325 0 2 0 7476 4190 23 
SITC 5 112732 1496 21 1671 9405 184558 286 
SITC 6 69014 45170 449 14842 8113 141675
9 
22660 
SITC 7 1637 268 167 3111 22376 87967 1163 
SITC 8 14934 8617 103 64 198 49308 69 
SITC 9 0 0 37 0 0 41 20 
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in relation to China. Generally, the trade relationship between China and BRI 
participants is based on trade of raw materials. 
 
4.1 Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
 
Table 2: Egypt - China 
 
 
Table 2 indicates that Egypt has comparative advantage in SITC 3 which includes 
natural gas and petrochemical products as well as SITC 2 which includes crude 




SITC 0 2.216239 
SITC 1 0 
SITC 2 0.310434 
SITC 3 4.310558 
SITC 4 0.073965 
SITC 5 1.041252 
SITC 6 0.93509 
SITC 7 0.00397 
SITC 8 0.224842 
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Table 3: Ethiopia - China 
 
 
Table 3 shows Ethiopia’s comparative advantage exist in SITC 2 especially oily seeds 
as well as a comparative advantage SITC 6 pertaining to leather. It was recorded that 
Ethiopia held a percentage of 8.25 of total exports to China. 
 
Table 4: Ghana - China 
 
 
Table 4 shows Ghana’s comparative advantage exist in SITC 2 particularly in crude 
materials as well as a comparative advantage in SITC 3 in particularly in petroleum 
oils. It was revealed that Ghana had a percentage of 11.88 in total exports to China. 
 
Ethiopia  
SITC 0 1.10357949 
SITC 1 0 
SITC 2 5.508729451 
SITC 3 0.000129025 
SITC 4 0 
SITC 5 0.049370663 
SITC 6 2.127546198 
SITC 7 0.002317451 
SITC 8 0.431531496 




SITC 0 0.954574516 
SITC 1 0 
SITC 2 1.124521837 
SITC 3 5.079179208 
SITC 4 0.000232991 
SITC 5 9.9288E-05 
SITC 6 0.003114091 
SITC 7 0.000207332 
SITC 8 0.000793794 
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Table 5: Kenya - China 
 
 
Table 5 shows that Kenya’s comparative advantage resides in crude materials SITC 2 
such as titanium, feldspar, niobium and tantalum as well as a comparative advantage 
in SITC 0 particularly in live animals and vegetables, oils and fats. The percentage of 
total exports to China was 2.1 percent. 
 
Table 6: Nigeria - China 
 
 
Table 6 shows Nigeria’s comparative advantage exist in SITC 3 particularly in oil and 
natural gas as well as a comparative advantage SITC 4 which is animals, oils, fats and 
 
Kenya 
SITC 0 2.757659548 
SITC 1 0.218031532 
SITC 2 5.582308974 
SITC 3 0.154096563 
SITC 4 0 
SITC 5 0.14612773 
SITC 6 1.903952957 
SITC 7 0.071438043 
SITC 8 0.009122829 




SITC 0 0.023071671 
SITC 1 0.032064363 
SITC 2 0.333379427 
SITC 3 5.568008322 
SITC 4 0.889079657 
SITC 5 0.053604544 
SITC 6 0.072011765 
SITC 7 0.035046741 
SITC 8 0.001814546 
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vegetables. It was recorded that Nigeria had a percentage of 3.1 of total exports to 
China. 
Table 7: South Africa - China 
 
 
Table 7 shows South Africa comparative advantage lie in ores SITC 2 as well as a 
comparative advantage in SITC 6. South Africa has the highest exports particularly in 
gold, copper, manganese. The percentage of total exports to China was 10.8 percent. 
 




SITC 0 0.929274157 
SITC 1 0.899633226 
SITC 2 5.683183325 
SITC 3 0.009891372 
SITC 4 0.085901458 
SITC 5 0.181338832 
SITC 6 2.16786927 
SITC 7 0.023751995 
SITC 8 0.07789963 




SITC 0 2.1478912 
SITC 1 28.0021352 
SITC 2 5.224486136 
SITC 3 0 
SITC 4 0.037904312 
SITC 5 0.019129131 
SITC 6 2.223293082 
SITC 7 0.020425951 
SITC 8 0.007522665 
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Table 8 reveals Tanzania has a comparative advantage in SITC 1 which is beverages 
and tobacco as well as a comparative advantage in SITC 2 and SITC 6 particularly in 
wood. It was revealed that Tanzania had a percentage of 6.2 in total exports to China. 
 
4.2 Trade Integration Index 
 
Table 9: Trade Integration Index between Africa and China 
 
 
Table 9 is the trade integration index between China and the selected African hubs 
which are Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania which 
lies on the route of the Maritime Belt and Road. Egypt’s exports to China is low, Egypt 
exports crude petroleum, unworked building stone and oranges. Compared to China’s 
exports to Egypt which are greater than 1, suggesting Egyptian dependence on exports 
from China, particularly on Non-retail synthetic filament yarn, TV and radio 
transmitters, Telecom parts and accessories and Optical instruments. (OEC, 2017)  
Trade integration between Ethiopia exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 reveals 
Ethiopia’s exports to China is low. However, for China there is a high demand for oil 
seeds, especially sesame since it is Ethiopia’s second largest export commodity, 
legumes, cut flowers, meat, coffee, sugar and tobacco which supports China’s 
dependence on Ethiopia for its agricultural needs. But China’s exports to Ethiopia is 
greater than 1, suggesting Ethiopian dependence on exports from China particularly in 
machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, electrical equipment, Iron and steel (OEC, 2017).  
Trade integration between Ghana exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 reveals 
Ghana and China equal dependence on each other. Ghana’s exports in non-fuel crude 
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materials such wood and metalliferous ores (SITC 2) and mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials including petroleum and natural gas (SITC 3) to China are 
particularly high, indicating reliance on these imports in China. Ghana quite similarly 
has a large reliance on Chinese imports in machines and machinery, construction 
materials and clothing (OEC, 2017).  
Trade integration between Kenya exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 reveals 
Kenya’s level of trade integration with China is very low. This is so because of 
Kenya’s lack of mineral fuel resources (Igbinoba, 2017) compared to China’s exports 
to Kenya which are greater than 1, suggesting Kenya dependence on exports from 
China particularly in electronic equipment, machinery, nuclear reactors and boilers 
(Trading economics, 2020).  
Trade integration between Nigeria exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 reveals 
Nigeria exports to China is low compared to China’s exports to Nigeria which are 
greater than 1, suggesting Nigeria dependence on exports from China particularly in 
machinery, boilers, nuclear reactors and electronic equipment. (Trading economics, 
2020). 
Trade integration between South Africa exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 
reveals that South Africa’s export integration with China is close to 1. Though reduced 
demand for minerals due to China’s economic change, it has seen a fall in exports, 
China is South Africans highest import partner compared to China’s exports to South 
Africa which are greater than 1, suggesting South Africa has more dependence on 
exports from China.  
Trade integration between Tanzania exports and the Chinese market in Table 9 reveals 
Tanzania exports to China is low. compared to China’s exports to Tanzania which are 
greater than 1, suggesting Tanzania dependence on exports from China particularly in 
machinery, equipment, constructions materials. (Trading economics, 2020) 
To summarize China’s trade integration with African markets is higher than Africa’s 
integration with China. With its position as Africa’s largest trading partner, African 
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countries are observed to be more dependent on Chinese imports, relative to China’s 
dependence on African exports and this reflects its growing trade deficit .  
 
4.3 Trade Complementarity Index 
 
Table 10: Trade Complementarity Index Between Africa and China 
 
 
Table 10 shows the degree to which exports complement or match various trading 
partners. The trade complementarity index ranges from 0 to 100, with a score of 100 
indicating trade cooperation between both of the parties is ideal.  
For Egypt, there is evidence of growing complementarity in its trade with China. 
Egypt’s exports to China are consist of ores, metals, chemical products, animals and 
agricultural produce such as fruits, nuts and cotton. Egypt’s imports from China are 
automobiles, electric and electronic goods, semi-finished goods.  
For Ethiopia, the degree of complementarity is low, regardless of the high trade 
intensity. Commodities such oily seeds, vegetables, flowers, nuts, coffee and meat 
exports are complemented by imports in heavy machinery, electric, electronics, 
medicines and automobiles. 
In the case of Ghana’s exports of unprocessed cocoa, raw metals, wood products, and 
petroleum oils complement the imports of iron, steel, electric and electronic goods. 
Kenya’s complementarity level is low and the exports of tropical fruits, cut flowers, 
legumes nuts, tobacco and tea complement the imports of machinery, electric, 
electronics and textiles from China.  
Egypt Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Tanzania
2018 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2018
57.11008 2.061569 1.983665 0.377066 1.36554 1.56757356 1.165871
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For Nigeria the exports of mineral fuels, oils, oil seed, grains, oleagic fruits, seeds and 
fruits complement the imports of electric, electronic goods, machines ad automobiles.  
In the case of South Africa’s exports of wines, agricultural products, ores, chemicals, 
and fruits complements the imports of miscellaneous goods, electrical, machines and 
mechanical products.  
For Tanzania, the exports of salt, Sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime, cement, iron, 
steel and oils complement the imports of machinery and transport equipment from 
China. Normally, the extent of complementarity grants potentials for trade cooperation 
due to the arrangement structure and of both parties’ exports. One could predict an 
increase in manufacturing investments and trade between both parties. This is due to 
the comparative advantages both of the parties have. 
 
4.4 Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Index 
 




Table 12: CHINA HHPI TO AFRICA 
 
 
HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod
0.15073 906 0.399997 346 0.267714 691 0.22662398 1003 0.729652 304 0.153057 1199 0.153057 791
2018






Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI Prod HHPI
1194 0.153621279 1149 0.421425628 1163 0.274022909 1171 0.228166296 1178 0.754738613 1178 0.152895487 1165 0.221343987
2019 20182018 2017 2018 2018 2019
Egypt Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Nigeria South Africa Tanzania
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HHPI measures exporting countries weakness to net gains or losses from trade caused 
by changes in international prices and in the volume of goods and services that are 
traded internationally. From the analysis, it was revealed that exports are focused in 
fewer segments as the indexes are not close to 0. This implies that exports are not well 
varied to reduce being exposed to risk. A possible reason why diversification is low 
may come from the arrangement of African industry and the exports that mostly 
focused on commodities that are primary. As showed in the index, China’s exporting 
products varies due to how engaged China is in tertiary and secondary economic areas. 
This will allow the capacity of exports to be more expanded on broader range of 
products as well as a produce a higher profitability margin. 
 
4.5 Observations, Implications and Recommendations 
 
While the BRI may appear to have lofty, seemingly impossible goals, the general 
concept of Sino-African economic integration is obviously achievable. Naturally, the 
possibility of integration imbalances and the associated political or socioeconomic by-
product are an important state to avoid. Successful economic integrations most likely 
require equilibrium among stakeholders. This section discusses those observations, 





Ethiopia’s economy has largely been agriculture-based with more than 40 percent of 
its GDP being directly attributed to agriculture or related activities. Even more 
ominous is the dependence of agriculture for both foreign capital and domestic survival; 
more than 85 percent of the populace dependent and 90 percent of exports (hence 
foreign capital) coming directly from it (Chakrabarty 2016). The country’s singular 
dependence is especially obvious in the Comparative Advantage indicators, with the 
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preceding sections displaying extreme advantage in SITC 2 and 6. This fixation on 
agricultural exports is appears to be planned economic specialization (albeit rather 
extreme) since the economy has grown with this focus. 
The Ethiopian economy’s growth, while appearing to vindicate its planners of the last 
two decades, may be propped and supported by an ugly truth: the increasing intensity 
of bilateral trade with China. Exports to China grew by 8 percent in less than a decade 
in the early 2000s which coincided with double digit economic growth (Chakrabarty 
2016). China’s major interest in Ethiopia’s exports is rather concentrated in sesame 
seeds with 66 percent of all exports in 2017 (OEC 2017). The uninformed reader may 
be unaware of China’s love of sesame since Ethiopian coffee is the country’s most 
famous export; indeed, China’s import of sesame fulfills a cultural need instead of any 
concrete one.  
Ethiopia’s imports, especially those from China outweigh the foreign capital from 
coffee and sesame. Machinery, construction materials, telecom and other 
infrastructure related goods are necessary to build a modern country yet these imports 
are likely to produce extreme strain on the populace via foreign debt. Chinese FDI, 
while slowly growing, has already displaced the competition in infrastructure, with 
China being involved in virtually all airport, power generation and telecommunication 
projects.  
 
Implications and Recommendations 
Building an economy on enabling the cultural habits of trade partners may be engender 
short-term successes for a populace in need of financial stability. The major indictment 
of Ethiopia’s economy is its susceptibility to collapse in the aftermath of future 
upheaval where austerity in larger economies can create enormous ripple effects. 
China’s love of sesame and the World’s love of coffee may shift with warning. The 
HHPI results clearly recommend diversification of exports, regardless of the export 
destination, failure to diversify will likely lead to an integration imbalance. A 
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candidate for diversification is the minor industrialization movement associated with 
production of leather. Some technology transfer with China would be necessary but is 
certainly achievable. 
 From China’s perspective, being involved in ‘nation building’ of this type is a major 
indication of the success of its policies to integrate. However, it is prudent to support 
Ethiopia without becoming its crutch, the Chinese economy, while officially world-
class should not be burdened with supporting a failed economy. Minor transfers of 
general technologies are an option to consider, stable technologies can become more 





Egypt occupies a rather unique role in the Belt and Road Initiative, being the only 
country with ties to both Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, Egypt’s inclusion 
in the initiative may appear awkward given the initiative has strong African leanings. 
While Egypt boast one of the better economies in Africa, China’s main imports are 
petroleum related, 60 percent (or greater) of exports to China are petroleum related 
(OECD 2017). This sector is rather volatile and extremely susceptible to economic and 
political interference, events which Egypt has had primary experiences with in the last 
decade. China, with its preference for peaceful rise has avoided such events and in the 
immediate aftermath of Egypt’s last upheaval, temporarily reduced its engagement 
(TIMEP 2019).  
Egypt’s foreign income appears to be a combination of tourism (Great Pyramids for 
example) and export of natural resources (Chen 2018). The Suez Canal and economic 
zone also appears to be a potential source of income since it controls a major shipping 
and logistics transit point. China has, in recent years, actively entered into cooperation 
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exchanges and infrastructure projects related to or near Suez Canal zone (TIMEP 
2019).  
Since 2012, China has surpassed the US to become Egypt’s largest trading partner, 
however, US and EU foreign direct investments (FDI) has not decreased in this time-
frame (Scott 2015). The total FDI has increased since China’s FDI has only added to 
the previous and continued investments from the West.   
 
Implications and Recommendations 
While Egypt’s economy exhibits some measure of diversity, the GDP-debt ratio has 
only marginally improved from its extreme point of 102 percent. The complementarity 
index, which seemingly indicates mutual need between China and Egypt, does not 
consider the dynamics of the exported goods. Natural resources such as petroleum 
while potentially important for economic growth, has volatility in the potential foreign 
capital gain. The Covid-19 pandemic is warning marker for the economy as petroleum 
and its related products have decreased in value, arriving at historic lows. 
Simultaneously, key actors in the fossil fuel industry are reducing investments in light 
of greater profitability in the alternative energy arena. The HHPI results reinforce this 
theory with its low outlook on the resistance to external factors. 
It is extremely important to reduce the risk of further instability and sustain integration 
with key trading partners. While the West has maintained its involvement, possibly 
from an idealistic perspective, it is imperative for Egypt to further diversify its foreign 
capital streams. The Suez Canal Economic Zone has major potential to boost income 
and growth, economists and planners should investigate further. China has entrenched 
itself in the economic zone and has promised investment in future infrastructure. These 
investments should be carefully coordinated and preserved since the economic zone 
has major potential in establishing a larger export market inclusive of Sub-Saharan 









Ghana occupies a distinctive role in the Belt and Road Initiative by virtue of its West 
African geopolitical status. Of the countries considered core or early BRI participants, 
Ghana, one of West Africa’s leading economies, is key to the China ambitions. Ghana 
is considered West Africa’s greatest potential market by FDI measures (AFDB 2020). 
Ghana’s major source of foreign capital is exports of crude/raw materials, petroleum 
and related products with these products essentially driving economic growth in the 
last decade (Danquah 2017). Unsurprisingly, exports to China are comprised of these 
categories, a staggering 91.5 percent of all exports in 2018 were petroleum products 
and metalliferous ores (Manganese ores etc.), the remainder being other crude 
materials such as wood (OEC 2018).  
While foreign capital enters the economy via exportation of natural resources and FDI, 
the domestic economy is supported by agriculture accounting for greater that 50 
percent of the workforce and 23 percent of the GDP since 2013 (FAPDA 2013). Minor 
industrial activity occurs as a side-effect of the sourcing of natural resources for export. 
China product exports into Ghana are essentially finished goods with heavy machinery, 
clothing, construction related goods headlining the import sheets. Comparative 
Advantage and Integration Index results imply a certain trade balance in the bilateral 
trade but this skew is rather obvious. Bilateral trade is essentially one-dimensional with 
both parties importing a single category of goods in large volumes. 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
Unlike Ethiopia and Egypt, China is not Ghana’s largest trading partner with the 
Eurozone holding that position. Similarly, Chinese investments in the economy has 
never surpassed 10 percent (Danquah 2017). The Complementarity Index appears to 
support the lack of complementarity between Ghana and China. Ghana’s wealth in 
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natural resources indicates that its industrial sector should perform more robustly. The 
industrial technology necessary to support this sector needs to be extended into other 
general industries. This is an opportunity for China to trade its technical knowledge 
for greater integration. Ghana also needs to add more diversity to its export portfolio, 





Kenya is one of the China’s most well-known allies in Africa with ties as early as the 
15th century. Kenya’s involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative is due to its key port 
at Mombasa which can be a secondary point for imports and exports where Egypt’s 
Suez Canal zone lacks resources or is overloaded.  Kenya itself does not maintain 
significant bilateral trade with China due to lack of resources in demand by China but 
provides alternative routes for imports from nearby land locked countries such as the 
Sudans (Sudan and South Sudan) and Uganda (Githaiga 2019, Farooq 2019).  To 
achieve this, China has invested heavily in transport infrastructure, building railways 
to connect Mombasa to Kenya’s interior, building a second a port at Lamu and 
planning an oil pipeline (Farooq 2019). Mombasa’s importance as a port of entry is 
due to its status as East Africa’s largest and most modern port. 
Kenya major import source switched from India to China in 2014 and the volume of 
imports has consistently increased. The construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway 
spiked imports for a few years as specialized products were necessary for the 
construction (Githaiga 2019). In 2018, electronics headlined Kenya’s imports but  in 
third position was Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment (Trading 
Economics 2018).  In contrast, Kenya’s exports to China consists of crude materials 
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Implications and Recommendations 
Kenya’s trade complementarity and integration indices are indicative of its weak 
bilateral trade with China. Indeed, China’s involvement with Kenya appears to be a 
pragmatic relationship where the macro-benefits are not derived from Kenya directly. 
The implication is that Kenya’s importance and inclusion in the Belt and Road 
Initiative is merely a geopolitical accident in collusion with China’s peaceful rise 
mantra. This clearly explains China’s economic disinterest with Kenya; all of the 
infrastructure projects in Kenya have provided little benefit to its economy. 
Researchers have cited jobs per kilometer of railway and greater employment numbers 
at Chinese involved enterprises and endeavors as positive impacts of China’s presence 
but note that the impact is neutral at best (Farooq 2019).   
Kenya needs to solve its trade imbalance with China and spur growth. Solving the 
imbalance implies that Kenya must provide new products in demand (or potentially in 
demand) to China. Growth can be achieved by utilizing the modern infrastructure 
being created by China for additional purposes other than facilitating China’s trade 
with neighboring states. Kenya could establish bilateral logistics agreements with 
Egypt to complement the Suez Canal with its modern port facilities.  China can 
negotiate a pact where Kenya’s ports are open to Europe and India for transits where 
China has preferential status. Additional secondary routes will become available, 





Nigeria is West Africa’s only other BRI participating country after Ghana and 
similarly covers an area known to be rich in natural resources especially petroleum 
products and metalliferous ores. Petroleum accounts for approximately 10 percent of 
GDP and 83 percent of all foreign income. Agriculture employs 36 percent of the 
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population and contributes approximately 21 percent to GDP (Nordea 2020). The 
domestic services sector is unusually robust with employment rates of 50 percent 
(Nordea 2020).  Nigeria has, in recent years, experienced turmoil and instability on 
scale only slightly lower than Egypt. While regime change did not occur, the 
government lost control of areas (especially rural areas) to insurgent groups led by 
Boko Haram. Like Ghana, there is a small industrial sector that employs 12 percent of 
all Nigerians but is beset by internal issues (Nordea 2020). 
Nigeria’s export profile is only marginally distinguishable from Ghana, more that 85 
percent of all exports to China were of petroleum related products, metalliferous ores 
and wood related raw products, an actual difference of approximately 5 percent with 
Ghana in 2018 (OEC 2018). The economy is extremely susceptible to fluctuations in 
oil prices and the government continuously adjust policies as reactions to oil price 
changes.  Nigeria imports finished products from China in the form of machinery, 
electronics, vehicles etc. (Trading Economics 2018). These imports have consistently 
increased since the late 1990s and has contributed to the trade imbalance with China 
(Adewuyi 2010).  
 
Implications and Recommendations 
Given Nigeria’s Comparative advantage is solely petroleum related products, a 
category of products that China imports from numerous trade partners and its weak 
integration index, it is unsurprising that the economy struggles even with current BRI 
projects. It is, however, extremely alarming that such a resource-rich state struggles 
with the volatility of oil exports (The Commonwealth 2020). Contrast with 
neighboring Ghana, which has generally avoided this volatility, the requisite actions 
to reduce this dependency should be sufficiently urgent. 
It is beyond prudent that Nigeria diversify its portfolio of foreign income sources. The 
government should implement methods to export its services industry to foreign 
partners. The potential growth for that half of the populace and the immediate 
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diversification is great. It is also necessary for the industrial sector to solve its issues 
with machinery and power supply to expand its reach. China has the technical 
knowledge and skills to assist the industry, it is necessary for bilateral agreements for 
knowledge transfer to be codified.  
 
4.5.6 South Africa 
 
Observations 
South Africa, home to Africa’s most famous economy and only African member of 
the G20 and BRICS is the most diversified economy of the continent.  The country’s 
major foreign income source is the export of natural resources particularly precious 
stones, ores and metals with accounting for approximately 60 percent of global exports 
(OEC 2018). The mining sector responsible for these exports is the fifth largest 
globally by GDP and contributes between 6 and 8 percent of the GDP. The industrial 
or manufacturing sector provides a greater percentage of the GDP at 13 percent. The 
finance sector and government via state owned enterprises (SOEs) contribute a further 
38 percent (Brand South Africa 2018).  
While the domestic economy is appropriately diversified (as is evident in the 
comparative advantage), South Africa’s export profile closely resembles its West 
African neighbors Ghana and Nigeria. The country’s major export destinations include 
the US, UK, Germany, Japan, China and the Netherlands, with China surpassing the 
others become the top export and import destination since 2009 (Mutambara 2017).  
Greater than 85 percent of China’s imports were from the mining sector in 2018 (OEC 
2018). South Africa imports of electrical and heavy machinery, electronics, 
mechanical appliances account for more than 40 percent of Chinese imports with other 
finished and semi-finished goods providing the difference. 
South Africa’s key economic challenge comes in the form social instability due to 
unprecedented high levels of unemployment for a growing economy. Almost 30 
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percent of the population is unemployed with greater than 50 percent of young adults 
reporting unemployment. This has resulted in a rather large inequality with the top 10 
percent controlling more than 70 percent of the wealth (World Bank 2019). 
 
Implications and Recommendations 
South Africa’s trade with China has a Comparative Advantage in categories where it 
is a major world producer.  These categories, however, are not crucial demands for 
China, this explain the substantially low integration index between the parties. While 
the export potential volatility is lower compared to petroleum related products, the 
income is of low value. The economy is unable to achieve better growth rates simply 
because the workforce is unskilled. The country needs to use the BRI to improve the 
skill-set of current and future laborers. People-to-People skills and technology transfer 





Tanzania is East Africa’s third participant in the BRI and operator of one of East 
Africa’s important ports. Bordered by Kenya in the north, Tanzania shares similar 
geographic strengths and weaknesses. Agriculture is Tanzania’s largest dependent 
sector, employing more than 60 percent of the populace and contributing between 24 
and 30 percent of the GDP (CIA 2020, MoF 2017). Mining of gold and other precious 
articles or minerals (stones and metals) has recently increased, adding potential new 
source of income from exports. This industry sector (including mining) contributes 
approximately 26 percent of the GDP with services (domestic) adding 37.5 percent of 
the GDP in 2017 (MoF 2017).  
Tanzania’s major export partners have consistently included India, South Africa, 
Kenya, Switzerland, Belgium, Democratic Republic of the Congo and China. India is 
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the largest export destination with China a close second, the countries swap positions 
with China being the largest import source and India second. (CIA 2020, MOFCOM 
2015). 
Tanzania’s export profile as of 2018 includes precious and semi-precious stones and 
metals, vegetable products such as tea, coffee etc., metals iron and copper and tobacco 
related products, the preceding which accounts for 50 percent of all global exports 
(OEC 2018). Copper, ores and metals along with seeds, grains and electrical 
parts/accessories comprise approximately 77 percent of all imports from Tanzania. 
China’s exports to Tanzania, like Kenya and other BRI participating countries consists 
of finished products, especially heavy machinery, vehicles and electronics.  
 
Implications and Recommendations 
Tanzania’s exports to China are disturbingly minor and inconsequential. The 
integration and complementarity indices strongly suggest that only Kenya is less 
important and exiguous. China’s stance in Kenya as previously discussed is ambivalent  
at best and it appears that, regardless of official statements, the same stance exists 
relative to Tanzania. Indeed, the largest projects between the parties are transport based, 
railways and ports and roads. This indicates that the country is mainly a transit and/or 
storage point for more important resources originating from other sources. Tanzania 
needs to explore its potential export income streams, especially in mining and 
petroleum (offshore is possibly better) to diversify its export portfolio. The country 
risks being unable to truly benefit from involvement in the BRI. The original TAZARA 
railway, a turnkey project, could have been re-purposed for better usage but simple 
died after the Chinese abandoned it. It is prudent that the government take the current 
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4.6 Policy Implications 
Given the implications and recommendations per bilateral relationship, there exists 
separate issues with the policy adjustments. These policy adjustments cannot be 
proposed or implemented in vacuum; bilateral relationships can become volatile. 
Policy changes always include some measure of uncertainty, some seen and 
unforeseen implications. This section discusses those implications as they relate to the 
BRI recommendations listed in the previous section. 
 
4.6.1 China 
Key officials and decision-makers of the BRI in China can be modestly elated with the 
current success of the Initiative. Africa is increasingly friendly to Asia in general and 
particularly China. These newfound allies are willing to support Chinese initiatives on 
a global scale. While developing and negotiating policy adjustments in the BRI, 
policymakers in Beijing should consider the following implications: 
Technology Transfer. China’s commitment to infrastructure projects for the 
BRI includes a hidden potential for influence. The US and Europe has 
traditionally been considered leaders in STEM. China’s meteoric rise has 
produced many modern technologies beyond the capabilities of other regions 
but has not been able to leverage this into greater global prominence. By 
teaching, adopting and maintaining technology in Africa, China’s tech can 
meaningfully influence Africa’s economic rise and provide non-Asia usage of 
competing products. Policy makers must decide what tech can be transferred 
to Africa, how transfers are coordinated, and which party administers transfer. 
The US and Europe manages these concerns via export controls that include 
clauses for technology. Tightly controlling the tech and transfers may compel 
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4.6.2 Africa 
The early returns for BRI participating countries have been relatively fruitful. 
Economic growth rates have increased, jobs and new markets are being created via 
China’s involvement. BRI countries need to be aware of how policies can positively 
and negatively influence internal issues, policymakers should be aware of the 
following implications in BRI policies and agreements: 
Technology Transfers. Africa’s major obstacle in transforming its economies is the 
lack of certain skill and technologies. Obtaining these technologies has been 
extremely difficult as Africa’s partners in the West are reluctant to share. China 
has historically exported semi-finished or finished products to Africa and has not 
shared raw technical skill but has changed policies since the BRI includes 
knowledge transfers. African leaders have managed to leverage educational 
transfers as part of the current BRI policies but have suffered, unsurprisingly, from 
brain drain, as the newly skilled students prefer to remain abroad.  
It is still prudent for African leaders to be aware of knowledge China is more 
willing to share, this avoiding the same issues with the West. Technology and skill 
transfers need to be targeted for sectors with promising growth. China typically 
will prefer to allow highly skilled individuals to remain in the country, hence the 
repatriation or economic contribution requirement needs to be strict.  
 
Infrastructure Sharing. Many of the infrastructure projects underway in BRI 
countries are based on loan or grant based financing with exclusivity for China’s 
uses. These exclusivity clauses are often the target of criticism, with many labelling 
it neo-colonialism. These agreements when revisited will certainly include 
tensions. African leaders need to be aware of the dependency on Chinses capital 
for future projects. While China is indeed willing to continue such participation, 
the relationship still requires mutual trust and benefit. Negotiating new sharing 
agreements will require some version of relatively greater benefits for China’s 
interests. These new agreements may also stoke geo-political interests and tensions 
inside and out of Africa.  
 
 






5 Summary and Conclusions 
The Belt and Road Initiative is a major factor in China’s ambitions for larger 
international cooperation and its peaceful rise. The participating countries and China 
have embarked on the creation of cooperation framework with rivalling or even 
surpassing the Eurozone. With China as the initiator, the Belt and Road Initiative 
priorities include economic cooperation. It is sufficiently obvious that China needs the 
raw material exports from Africa, similarly, Africa needs access to the Chinese market. 
The bilateral trade values in SITC categories and the computed Revealed Comparative 
Advantage supports the mutual need. While the BRI parties may have mutual need, 
the Trade Intensity Index indicates that African dependence on China is greater than 
China’s integration with Africa. The BRI African economies are still developing and 
require a trading partner willing to sustain large import volumes long-term even during 
economic volatility; especially since HHPI has a low outlook on raw material exports. 
China is one of few trading partners able to fulfill this role and requiring the products 
exported out of Africa. Ironically, the Complementarity Index implies that China’s 
need does not directly complement BRI exports even though the import volumes have 
consistently increased.  
Most of the African BRI economies suffer from lack of skills and advanced 
knowledge. Ethiopia and Tanzania on the east coast, Ghana and Nigeria on the west 
coast have economies with varying degrees of industrialization which can be boosted 
by technology transfer from China. South Africa similarly needs skilled laborers in 
many sectors where unemployment surpasses the African and World average. Thus, 
the recommendation for those economies is to negotiate knowledge transfers with 
China. Egypt and Kenya hold strategic importance for logistics via the Suez Canal and 
Mombasa ports but provide no raw material resources to China. In these economies, 
the recommendation is re-use important shipping corridors via sharing agreements. 
The policy implications for China and Africa in future policy adjustments are mainly 
technology transfer, infrastructure sharing and policy on internal politics. China will 




can become strained; Beijing will also need to decide an amicable strategy for 
technology and knowledge sharing that protects its interests while preserving its 
competitiveness in foreign markets. Africa needs to present its adjustments precisely 
to prevent policy failures with technology transfer or risk alienation or tension with 
China when including non-BRI partners. 
In conclusion, the Belt and Road Initiative, while extremely successful with its current 
policies, can be improved by achieving greater integration among participants. African 
economies have many more unclaimed benefits available via lesser adopted or mis-
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